Viking Star CDC inspection score

Black pipes were on the bottom left side of the technical compartment below the coffee machine, which made it difficult to clean.

The seam between the back bulkhead picture and white counter backsplash was soiled and in poor repair.

One small black fly was in the area. The station was in operation. No food was impacted at the time of the observation.

One small black fly was in the beverage station. The station was in operation.No food was impacted at the time of the observation.

On 12 and 13 October, Manfredi's cooling logs indicated Tiramisu was not properly cooled below 41°F. On 12 October the 'time in' was 1048 with a 'temperature in' at 68.7°F. At 1220 the temperature was 69°F. This was the final recorded time and temperature for this food item on the log. On 13 October the 'time in' was 1230 with a 'temperature in' at 68.7°F. At 1356 the temperature was 68.4°F. This was the final recorded time and temperature for this food item on the log. The logs were reviewed and signed by a supervisor.

Condensate formed around the outside of the left undercounter refrigerator door. It appeared the door gasket did not seal properly along the bottom.

Condensate formed around the outside of the left undercounter refrigerator door. It appeared the door gasket did not seal properly along the bottom.

In the far left undercounter technical compartment for cold counter F-3, a gap the pipe where it penetrated the back bulkhead. A reefer fitter quickly replaced the foam before the end of the inspection.

One small black fly was inside the pastry container. The station was in operation. No food was impacted at the time of the observation.

One small black fly was inside the pastry container. The station was in operation. No food was impacted at the time of the observation.

The food and beverage questionnaires stated for voyages commencing on 9/6/2022 and 7/12/2022, each 'food worker' AGE case had eaten in the crew mess for both lunch and dinner. However the staff verified that based on the onset and isolation times, the ill crew members were in their cabins under surveillance. It was determined that staff had not followed up to verify the information on this questionnaire was accurate.

On voyage dated 7/26 - 8/9/2022, a food worker who met the AGE case definition had illness onset on 8/1/2022, but did not report to medical until 8/2/2022 at 0530. The log noted 15 episodes of diarrhea had taken place between the first symptom and the time reported to medical. The inspector noted that the ship had reprimanded this crew member accordingly. Timecards for this crew member were verified that they had not worked during this time.

The testable backflow assembly log stated the (RPZ) assemblies for the international shore connection located at FR6, FR19, FR268 portside and FR268 starboard side were tested on 2/24/2022, 5/25/2022, 5/19/2022, and 5/20/22 respectively. When the inspector asked staff how these devices are inspected, no standard operating procedure was presented, and no staff member knew how to energize the system to test these assemblies under pressure while under operation. It was determined by staff and the inspector that this test had not been conducted, yet testing dates were entered. Staff produced a procedure and pictures detailing how to test these assemblies and presented this information to the inspector by the end of the inspection. Staff agreed to test these assemblies immediately and update their testable backflow assembly log with the correct test cock pressures, differential pressures, and test dates accordingly.

The light intensity was less than 220 lux on the left side of the fish preparation counter.

A gasket on a combination oven in this area that was in use was leaking and dripping water onto the deck.

The sanitizing bucket in this area contained cloudy water while the bakery was open.

A gasket on a combination oven in this area that was in use was leaking and dripping water onto the deck and causing a small puddle under the oven..

The deckhead inside technical space (1.1.10) between the bulkheads contained approximately 2 cm of standing water.

An open carton of milk on temperature control dated 14-17 October measured 47°F. The refrigerator door had been left cracked open. The milk was discarded.

There was no ambient temperature measuring device in the refrigerator that contained an open carton of milk.

A soiled black napkin was stored on the racking holding previously cleaned dishes in this pantry while the area was open.

During breakfast one previously cleaned dinner plate in the clean dish area was found to contain food debris. This plate was taken to be rewashed.

Pipes were striped blue/green/blue after the potable water backflow prevention device identified as 'BFP Technical Water to Engine Dk C FR 217 Port' on the cross-connection control log. Crew reported that the pipes supplied potable water to technical spaces and that the water was not technical water. Crew confirmed that there were chemical connections such as chlorine drums. Crew noted that all connections in technical rooms were also protected by local backflow prevention devices.

The inspector measured 2.55 ppm, 2.77 ppm, and 2.65 ppm chlorine at the Deck 6 Far Point. Crew measured 2.39 ppm and 2.49 ppm chlorine at the deck 6 far point. The analyzer measured 1.99-2.00 ppm during the readings. Crew contacted technical staff who confirmed that they had just changed tanks, and crew explained that the readings are often inaccurate for approximately 30 minutes. Crew calibrated the analyzer on the spot. The deck 7 far point was in calibration for chlorine measurements, and chlorine levels at the deck 6 and deck 7 far points were both above 2 ppm.

The sanitizing bucket in this area contained cloudy water while the area was open for service.

During review of the OPRP with housekeeping staff, the OPRP did not detail the concentration and contact time for Oxivir during the green level. This was noted on the previous inspection in January 2017. Additionally, crew were unable to show the inspector contact times for Oxivir for the red, yellow, or green level. Crew confirmed that the contact times were not listed in the plan, but that they let the product air dry for 5 minutes. After further discussion about contact time versus air dry time, crew confirmed that surfaces would be wet for a 5 minute contact time. Two supervisory level crew members confirmed that the concentration of Oxivir in the green level and that contact times were not listed in the plan. Crew showed the inspector both a printed copy and electronic copy of the OPRP; both copies of the plan had last been updated in 2016 according to the documents. Crew reported that the OPRP was a corporate plan and not controlled by the vessel crew. Later during the inspection, crew presented documentation of a document that had track changes which noted that during level green, 50-20 ppm chlorine would be used in food contact/preparation areas (but no contact time was noted) and Oxivir Spray Plus (1:32; 1500 ppm) would be used with a 5 minute contact time for nonfood-contact areas. The track changes noted concentrations and contact times for chemicals used in yellow, silver, and red levels. The crew demonstrated that the file on the computer with the track changes had been edited prior to the inspection and had not been edited the day of the inspection. It was not clear if the updates had been finalized and distributed to all crew.

There was no documentation of the sand filter housing disinfection with 50 ppm halogen-based disinfectant for 1 minute or an equivalent CT value when the sand filter media was replaced.